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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Nancy Rubel appeals the United States Tax Court’s 
dismissal of her petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Because 
Rubel failed to file her petition by the deadline set forth in 26 
U.S.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A), and because that deadline is 
jurisdictional, the Tax Court properly dismissed her petition, 
and we will affirm.     
 
I 
 
Generally, when spouses file a joint tax return, each 
spouse is jointly and severally liable for the tax due.  26 
U.S.C. § 6013(d);  Callaway v. Comm’r, 231 F.3d 106, 111 
(2d Cir. 2000).  Under § 6015(c), a jointly filing spouse may 
seek relief from joint and several liability for a tax deficiency 
if the couple is legally separated, no longer married, and not 
living together.1  § 6015(c).  In addition, for taxpayers who do 
not satisfy § 6015(c), the IRS has discretion to grant relief 
where it would be “inequitable to hold the individual liable 
for any . . . deficiency.”  Id. § 6015(f).  These avenues for 
relief are referred to as the innocent spouse relief provisions.  
If the IRS denies relief, then the taxpayer may file a petition 
with the Tax Court.  Id. § 6015(e).   
 
Rubel and her ex-husband filed joint income tax 
returns from 2005 through 2008.  They had an unpaid tax 
liability for each year.  In 2015, Rubel asked the IRS to 
                                                 
1 Section 6015(b) provides an avenue to seek relief 
where the joint return understates the amount the taxpayers 
owe.  26 U.S.C. § 6015(b). 
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relieve her from this liability under the innocent spouse relief 
provisions of § 6015.     
 
On January 4, 2016, the IRS sent Rubel three identical 
notices of its final determination denying her requests for 
relief for tax years 2006 through 2008.  On January 13, 2016, 
the IRS sent Rubel a similar denial for the 2005 tax year.  The 
determinations notified Rubel that, if she disagreed with the 
IRS’s decision, she could file a petition with the Tax Court to 
review the denial for relief within ninety days from the date 
of the determination.  Accordingly, Rubel needed to file a 
petition with the Tax Court by April 4, 20162 for the 2006 
through 2008 tax years and by April 12, 2016 for the 2005 tax 
year.  
Before filing a petition with the Tax Court, Rubel 
submitted additional information to the IRS.  In a March 3, 
2016 letter, the IRS informed Rubel that it “considered the 
information and still propose[d] to deny relief in full.”  App. 
45.  The IRS also notified Rubel of the following: 
 
Please be advised this correspondence doesn’t 
extend the time to file a petition with the U.S. 
Tax Court.  Your time to petition the U.S. Tax 
Court began to run when we issued you our 
final determination on Jan. 04, 2016 and will 
end on Apr. 19, 2016.  However, you may 
continue to work with us to resolve your tax 
                                                 
2 The ninetieth day after January 4, 2016, was Sunday, 
April 3, 2016.  The Internal Revenue Code provides that the 
deadline for filing a petition is extended until the “next 
succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal 
holiday.”  Id. § 7503. 
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matter. 
 
App. 45.  This letter contained incorrect information.  The 
deadlines for Rubel to petition the Tax Court regarding the 
final determinations were April 4 and 12, 2016, not April 19, 
2016.   
 
 Rubel mailed a petition challenging the IRS’s 
determinations to the Tax Court on April 19, 2016.  The IRS 
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that because Rubel 
failed to file the petition within ninety days of the date of the 
notices of final determination, the Tax Court lacked 
jurisdiction to review the petition under § 6015(e)(1)(A).  
Rubel opposed the motion and argued that the March 3, 2016 
letter started a new ninety-day period for filing a petition and, 
in any event, that the IRS should be equitably estopped from 
relying on the statutory deadline because the March 3 letter 
contained erroneous information.  The Tax Court agreed with 
the IRS and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  
Rubel appeals. 
II3 
 
 Congress set forth the jurisdiction of the Tax Courts in 
Title 26.  26 U.S.C. § 7442.  Thus, we turn to Title 26 to 
determine whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction to entertain 
                                                 
 3 The Tax Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the petition because it was not filed within the deadline set 
forth in § 6015(e)(1)(A).  We have jurisdiction to review the 
decision of the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) and 
conduct a de novo review of its determination of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Sunoco Inc. v. Comm’r, 663 F.3d 181, 
185 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Rubel’s petition to review the IRS’s denial of her request for 
innocent spouse relief under § 6015.  Section 6015 provides: 
 
In the case of an individual . . . who requests 
equitable relief[,] . . . the individual may 
petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall 
have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate 
relief available to the individual under this 
section if such petition is filed . . . not later than 
the close of the 90th day after the date [on 
which the IRS mails notice of its final 
determination of relief available to the 
individual]. 
 
Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A).  The question in this case is whether the 
ninety-day deadline in § 6015(e)(1)(A) is a jurisdictional 
requirement or a claims-processing deadline.4  If 
§ 6015(e)(1)(A) is a claims-processing statute, Rubel’s failure 
to comply with it may be subject to waiver, forfeiture, and 
equitable tolling.  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).  If, on the other hand, 
the deadline in § 6015(e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional, Rubel’s 
failure to comply with it deprives the Tax Court of the 
authority to hear the case, “even if equitable considerations 
would support extending the prescribed time period.”  United 
States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (2015).  
Thus, determining that a deadline is jurisdictional has the 
                                                 
4 A claims-processing statute or rule “promote[s] the 
orderly progress of litigation by requiring parties to take 
certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”  
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 
(2011).   
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important consequence of limiting a court’s power to decide a 
case.  See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 
428, 435 (2011).   
 
Because of the consequence of deeming a deadline 
jurisdictional, the Supreme Court has cautioned against “drive 
by jurisdictional rulings,” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 
500, 511 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and has 
directed that we examine statutes to determine if they “speak 
in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction 
of the  . . . courts,” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 
385, 394 (1982).  As a result, to determine whether a statutory 
deadline is jurisdictional or claims processing in nature, we 
examine the “text, context, and relevant historical treatment” 
of the provision.  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 
154, 166 (2010).  In examining the text, we look at the plain 
language to determine if it speaks in jurisdictional terms, 
meaning whether it speaks “to the power of the court rather 
than to the rights or obligations of the parties.”5  Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  One way Congress speaks in such terms is 
when it clearly labels a requirement as jurisdictional.  Reed 
Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 166.   
 
Section 6015(e)(1)(A) states that “the Tax Court shall 
have jurisdiction” if an individual files a petition in the court 
no later than ninety days after the IRS mails its notice of final 
                                                 
5 Section 6015(e)(1)(A) embodies the obligation of a 
litigant to seek relief within ninety days after the IRS’s final 
determination and, embedded within it, explicitly states that 
the Tax Court has jurisdiction if the petition is filed within 
that deadline.   
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determination.  For purposes of this analysis, we must 
presume that Congress knows that the term “jurisdiction” 
refers to the authority of a court to hear and decide a case and 
that it deliberately included that word in the statute.  
Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 
F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc).  Therefore, in 
circumstances like this, where Congress “clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed 
and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.”  Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 515-16 (footnote omitted).  Accordingly, Congress’s 
explicit statement that § 6015(e)(1)(A)’s time limit is 
jurisdictional means that it is and that the Tax Court lacks 
authority to consider untimely petitions.6  
While we need not analyze the issue further, other 
tools of statutory construction bolster our conclusion that § 
6015(e)(1)(A)’s time limit is jurisdictional.  First, the context 
of the provision—how § 6015(e)(1)(A) fits within the statute 
as a whole—shows that it is jurisdictional.  See Kwai Fun 
Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1628.  The statute’s grant of jurisdiction 
to the Tax Court and the time limit for activating that 
jurisdiction are located within the same provision.  See § 
                                                 
6 Section 6330, which deals with judicial review of tax 
levy determinations, contains a similarly worded time 
limitation that our sister circuits have held to be jurisdictional.  
26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) (providing that a “person may, within 
30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax 
Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court 
shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)”); 
Hauptman v. Comm’r, 831 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 2016); 
Gray v. Comm’r, 723 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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6015(e)(1); see also Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1628 
(observing that when Congress separates a filing deadline 
from a jurisdictional grant the deadline is often not 
jurisdictional).  Moreover, the provision is located within the 
same subsection of § 6015 that sets forth other conditions that 
trigger or limit the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  § 6015(e)(3) 
(setting forth the limitations on the Tax Court’s jurisdiction); 
see also Bartman v. Comm’r, 446 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 
2006) (holding that notice of deficiency described in 
6015(e)(1) is a jurisdictional prerequisite); Comm’r v. Ewing, 
439 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).  In addition, 
the filing period and the filing of the petition itself impacts 
the IRS’s ability to begin its collection efforts.  More 
specifically, § 6015(e)(1)(B)(i) provides that no levy or 
collection proceeding can commence during the ninety-day 
window to petition for relief or, if a petition is filed in the Tax 
Court, until the Tax Court’s decision becomes final.  This 
further reflects that the ninety-day period is meant to allocate 
when different components of the tax system have the 
authority to act and further supports the view that § 6015(e) is 
jurisdictional.  Thus, the structure of § 6015 reflects 
Congress’s intent to set the boundaries of the Tax Court’s 
authority.7   
                                                 
 7 Petitioner relies on Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013), but it does not help her position.  
The statute at issue there set forth the time-frame within 
which a healthcare provider had to file an administrative 
appeal from a Medicare reimbursement determination.  The 
statute provides that the provider “may obtain a hearing” from 
the administrative board if “such provider files a request for a 
hearing within 180 days after the notice of . . . final 
determination.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3).  The Supreme 
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Second, the Supreme Court has historically found that 
filing deadlines in tax statutes are jurisdictional because 
allowing case-specific exceptions and individualized equities 
could lead to unending claims and challenges and upset the 
IRS’s need for “finality and certainty.”  Becton Dickinson & 
Co. v. Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir. 2000); 
accord United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 349-54 
                                                                                                             
Court held that the 180-day deadline was not a jurisdictional 
deadline because the provision does not “speak in 
jurisdictional terms” and “contains neither the mandatory 
word ‘shall’ nor the appellation ‘notice of appeal,’ words with 
jurisdictional import.”  Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 
824-25; see also V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1021 (2016) 
(reviewing a state statute, which sets forth the conditions 
under which a child with living parents may be adopted, 
“does not speak in jurisdictional terms” and observing that its 
use of mandatory language alone is insufficient to deem 
jurisdictional).  Section 6015(e)(1), in contrast, speaks in 
jurisdictional terms by it use of the word “shall” and 
“jurisdiction” in the same sentence.   
 Moreover, while “filing deadlines ordinarily are not 
jurisdictional,” Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 825, 
Congress’s use of language that “speaks in jurisdictional 
terms” makes the deadline jurisdictional.  It spoke in such 
terms in § 6015(e)(1), by using the word “jurisdiction” and 
structuring the section so jurisdiction is triggered by the 
timely filing of a petition and its placement of the deadline 
with other items that related to jurisdiction.  As a result, 
unlike the statute in Auburn, § 6015 “duly instruct[s]” us to 
treat the ninety-day deadline as jurisdictional.  Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 515.    
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(1997) (“Tax law . . . is not normally characterized by case-
specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.”).  
Rigid deadlines, such as those embodied in the tax law’s 
jurisdictional requirements, promote predictability of the 
revenue stream, which is vital to the government.  See Becton 
Dickinson, 215 F.3d at 348 (stating that “the nature of the 
underlying subject matter—tax collection” underscores the 
need for an emphatic deadline (quoting Brockamp, 519 U.S. 
at 352)).   
 
 For these reasons, the Tax Court correctly concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Rubel’s untimely 
petition.  While the IRS’s administrative mistake in its March 
3, 2016 letter may have contributed to Rubel’s delay and 
resulting inability to have the IRS’s innocent spouse 
determination subjected to judicial review, the ninety-day 
deadline is jurisdictional and cannot be altered “regardless of 
the equities” of the case,8 Becton Dickinson, 215 F.3d at 345; 
see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 
824 (2013) (observing that if a deadline is jurisdictional, it is 
not subject to equitable tolling).  Thus, the Tax Court was 
required to dismiss the petition.        
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Tax 
Court’s dismissal of Rubel’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
                                                 
8 While the Tax Court and this Court cannot alter a 
jurisdictional deadline, and the taxpayer is responsible for 
calculating when the deadline expires, we remind the IRS to 
exercise care when drafting correspondence to a taxpayer to 
assure it is accurate.   
